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Abstract 
 
In recent years there has been growing interest in how societies and states should address 
past wrongdoing. Despite attention to issues of responsibility and moral reparation, 
however, institutional (moral) responsibility remains relatively unstudied. To this end, the 
article critically evaluates the UN’s moral responsibility in the world’s deadliest conflict 
since World War II, namely the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). It 
argues that the UN Security Council should be held morally accountable for its 
(mis)management of the refugee crisis following the Rwandan genocide as well as its 
non-robust response to the repeated violations of the state sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the DRC by neighbouring countries. 
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Introduction 
Politicians and academics are paying more attention to normative inquiries addressing 
how societies and states should account for past wrongdoing. Here, the struggle of South 
African society to come to terms with its racist Apartheid regime springs to mind; in this 
sense, its Truth and Reconciliation Commission emerges as a landmark decision.1 An 
equally interesting example is the recent public apology by the Canadian government to 
Native Canadians; in a sad era in Canadian history, approximately 150,000 children were 
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forced to attend state residential schools where they suffered abuse and where a 
systematic effort was made to eradicate local languages and traditions.2 This recent 
proclivity to scrutinize past wrongdoing has been diffused into international politics as 
well.3 In 1999, President Clinton offered an apology to the Guatemalan people for the US 
support of the right-wing government that systematically executed tens of thousands of 
rebels as well as native Mayan Indians during the ‘dirty war’ that lasted 36 years.4  
 The examination of past wrongdoing and the emergence of diverse responses to it, 
ranging from truth recovery to restorative justice models and inter-state apologies, show a 
willingness to reply to (normative) questions of moral responsibility. Although there is a 
widely shared (academic and political) consensus that individual leaders,5 domestic 
institutions, and even states can be held morally accountable for their actions or 
omissions -- domestically or internationally -- the reluctance to assign moral 
responsibility to international institutions is remarkable.6 In the state-centric discipline of 
International Relations, the privileged position reserved for states, along with the 
tendency to perceive international organizations as merely forums for competing (state) 
interests, partially explains this hesitation to ascribe ‘ontological independence’ to 
international organizations.7This is paradoxical, given that the majority of contemporary 
economic, social, and political problems, including environmental degradation, global 
inequality, famine and security, stem from large-scale forces, such as globalization, 
which render insufficient any individual effort to redress them.8   
The article adopts a multi-disciplinary perspective, cutting across Law, 
International Relations, Ethics, and organization theory. Because international law does 
not stand on its own, significant insights can be gleaned from multi-disciplinary 
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analytical approaches to complex issues such as genocide and the moral accountability of 
international actors. This paper focuses on the possibility of ascribing moral agency to the 
UN, the guarantor of security and international peace. More explicitly, this paper seeks to 
examine in what ways – if any – the UN can be held morally accountable for its actions 
or omissions in the unfolding of the worst humanitarian crisis since World War II, 
namely, the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) from the mid-1990s to 
2003. It remains the world’s deadliest conflict since World War II, with approximately 
3.9 million casualties.9 This conflict encompasses almost all features of the new ‘complex 
humanitarian emergencies’ that have characterized intrastate conflicts since the 1990s, 
including long duration, high death-toll among civilians, the collapse of the state, and the 
emergence of threats to international peace and security.10 Further, the transformation of 
the conflict into a continental war or ‘Africa’s Great War’, encompassing the armed 
forces of eight neighbouring countries, makes this case particularly instructive. To what 
extent is the UN morally responsible?  
In the first part of the article, drawing primarily on the work of Toni Erskine, I 
will identify the basic preconditions for an institution to be the bearer of moral 
responsibility. I will then apply these preconditions to the UN, considering whether it can 
be held morally accountable for its actions and omissions. In the second part, I will assess 
the UN’s moral responsibility in the unfolding of the Congolese conflict. I will argue that 
despite early warnings from UN agencies working in the DRC, decision-makers at UN 
headquarters failed to respond appropriately in two key instances: the refugee crisis 
(1994-1996) and the ensuing repeated violation of DRC’s sovereignty and territorial 
integrity (1996-2003). 
 4 
 
Institutional responsibility and the United Nations 
This section considers the preconditions of moral agency and asks whether these 
conditions are met by the UN. Is the UN a moral agent in international politics and 
therefore morally accountable for its actions and omissions? Before proceeding, some 
background information on the UN seems useful. First, the UN is a complicated 
international organization comprised of numerous (Treaty-based or Charter-based) bodies 
and groups, including the Secretariat, UNHCHR, UNDPKO, Security Council, and 
Human Rights Council.11 Its complex and unique internal structure should be taken into 
account in any discussion of its responsibility. Although a central task of this paper is to 
examine whether the UN can be the bearer of moral agency, I do not perceive the UN as 
an internally coherent entity but a complex and unique organization, a particularly ‘hard 
case’.12 Second, the UN is expected to act in exceptional external conditions. As the 
guarantor of international security and peace, it must coordinate the action of its 192 
members13 and prevent or intervene in extreme situations such as ethnic cleansing and 
genocide. Given this complexity, assigning responsibility should remain case-specific. 
Equally, because the UN is a complex and unique organization, there are degrees of 
moral responsibility among the different UN organs/bodies. 
Toni Erskine, in her influential analysis, says that to qualify as moral agent, an 
international organization should have ‘an identity that is more than the sum of the 
identities of its constitutive parts and, therefore, does not rely on a determinate 
membership; a decision-making structure; an identity over time; and a conception of 
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itself as a unit’.14 In addition, to be considered a moral agent, a collective should have the 
capacity to transform its decisions into actions.15Does the UN satisfy these preconditions? 
i. Corporate identity. 
Initially, the institution under examination must be more than the sum of its constituent 
parts.16 In other words, does the UN possess a (corporate) identity that cannot be reduced 
to the identities of its constituent member-states, thus making it morally accountable for 
its actions and omissions? Can we say that ‘what it does is caused by its own wants and 
beliefs and not merely the wants and beliefs of certain powerful individuals’?17  
Erskine notes that according to international law, to be characterized a ‘person’, 
an entity should have an identity which is significantly distinct from its constituents. The 
UN is a bearer of ‘International Legal Personality’; legally, then, it has a distinct 
identity.18 Albeit a legal argument, this it illustrates the distinct identity of the UN; 
further, because its legal actions have moral implications, we can consider the UN a 
moral agent. We also need to consider the ‘bottom-up’ approach of international 
organizations (such as the UN); through its ‘bureaucratic culture’ the organization will be 
significantly independent of the members that created it.19 According to this 
constructivist view argued by Michael Barnett20 and Martha Finnemore, the rational and 
legal authority of international organizations allows them to pursue objectives selected 
according to established priorities of the organization, thus securing a level of 
independence from their member-states. Furthermore, every organization develops a 
‘bureaucratic culture’ which informs the discourses (i.e. formal or informal rules) that 
shape its policies.21 More specifically, the bureaucrats (agents) in the UN pursue not only 
the agenda imposed by their principals (states) but are also affected by the ‘cultural 
 6 
landscape’ which enables them to pursue their own bureaucratic agendas.22 This ‘cultural 
landscape’ makes bureaucracy and subsequently the organization itself an independent 
site of authority from its constituents; thus, it is plausible to consider the UN as having 
sufficient ‘ontological independence’ to qualify as a moral agent. 
 
ii. Decision-making structure. 
Another important criterion is a coherent internal decision-making structure, meaning 
that the group has the capacity to deliberate. This decision-making structure allows the 
group to be an independent ‘rational actor’23 and to convert individual actions into a 
unitary intentional corporate action. 24 More precisely, if a group has a ‘constitution’ - a 
set of pre-existing formal or informal rules which determine how the ‘inputs’ of 
individual judgements are put together to generate group judgments as ‘outputs’ - then 
we can plausibly argue that this group has a coherent decision-making structure and is a 
moral agent.25 Groups lacking such ‘constitution’, such as crowds or mobs, lack the 
capacity to pass corporate judgments and thus do not qualify as moral agents.  
Does the UN have a ‘constitution’ which can convert the diverse judgments and 
interests (input) of individual member-states into a coherent ‘collective’ output? If so, the 
UN through this ‘internal organization’ (i) possesses moral deliberation; (ii) surmounts 
individual interests; (iii) represents the unity of the organization; and (iv) responds 
according to moral-rational evaluation.26 
According to Erskine, the UN Charter provides a full account of the functioning 
of the organization, as clarified in Chapter V.27 Thus, we can argue that the UN possesses 
a decision-making structure that converts individual judgments into ‘corporate’ action. 
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However, at this point, a legitimate objection by Chris Brown should be noted. According 
to Brown, the UN Security Council cannot act as an agent of international society, 
because even if states pursue the common good for the ‘society of states’, at the same 
time, they also pursue their own national interests.28 Hence, in case of conflict between 
the common good and their own interests, the five permanent members of the Security 
Council, are legitimized to pursue the latter; most importantly, as long as they have the 
veto provision, the decision-making procedure mentioned previously vanishes.29 In cases 
where veto is being exercised we cannot argue for a coherent decision-making procedure; 
nor can we argue that the UN is a moral agent distinct from its constituents.30  
Still, it can be argued that the UN is capable of moral deliberation if it can 
‘respond to events and moral criticism by altering its intentions and behaviour’.31 The UN 
frequently feels obligated to justify its actions on ethical grounds, and on various 
historical occasions - such as the Srebrenica massacre - the UN proved capable of 
introspection into past omissions and actions.32  
 
iii. Identity over time and conception of itself as unit. 
To qualify as a moral agent, the UN should have continuity, irrespective of external 
events; at the same time, it should not be merely externally defined but have a 
consciousness of itself as a unit. Following Erskine, ‘the United Nations […] does 
possess an identity over time. Indeed, it exists prior to the crises to which it is charged 
with responding, and its existence outlives any response’.33 Alternatively put, the UN was 
established in the aftermath of World War II with certain objectives, the most important 
of which were the prevention of violent conflicts, and the promotion of peace and 
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security. It has a ‘prospective’ responsibility to respond when a threat to these objectives 
arises. Otherwise, it would be a ‘coalition of the willing’ responding to certain stimuli 
(crises) within a specific time limit.34  
Even though the persons holding the central positions in the UN change, its 
institutional status and identity are unaffected. For example, although the UN Secretary 
General may change, this does not indicate a change in the institution of the ‘Secretariat’. 
The UN flag, the blue helmets in peacekeeping operations, and even the international soil 
under the headquarters of the organization in New York, all symbolically represent this 
distinct identity. The UN also has a monopoly on legitimising international actors35 and 
defining members of international society.36 This has become an inherent characteristic of 
the UN identity. 
iv. Capacity to act and mandated responsibility. 
Logically deriving from the previous preconditions, coherence of identity and a clearly 
defined decision-making structure should be coupled with the agent’s capacity to 
implement decisions.37 It would be absurd to hold accountable an international 
organization that possesses all preconditions but is unable to transform its decisions into 
actions. Therefore, an international institution should possess at least a rudimentary 
executive capacity in order to qualify as a moral agent. 
The UN is the designated international body with the ‘responsibility to act’ in 
specific circumstances. These actions fluctuate from vigorous interventions such as 
peacekeeping operations which may resort to armed force, to political acts such as 
mediation initiatives.38 Furthermore, analysis of UN activities over recent decades reveals 
a new competence. More explicitly, its activities in the post cold-war period have 
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increased, especially in cases of ‘failed’ or ‘collapsed’ states.39 The UN has developed 
not only peacekeeping missions but a number of administrative operations in conflict 
ravaged states, establishing a trend called ‘post-conflict development’ or ‘post-conflict 
reconstruction’. In such operations, UN agencies manage virtually every sector of public 
administration, including security, elections, tax collection, border control, even issuing 
identity cards. In several conflict-ridden countries, the UN has become the prime 
coordinator of local efforts to establish mechanisms of transitional justice, such as truth 
commissions and domestic criminal courts.40 For some scholars, this trend sets the stage 
for a new (Post-Westphalian) model of sovereignty, more related to the ‘control’ of the 
population and responsibility than to the notion of territory. These ‘proto-sovereign’ 
competences verify the impression that the UN is the competent organization to respond 
to humanitarian crises.  
Howard Adelman inserts an interesting element into the preconditions of 
institutional moral agency when he highlights the ‘mandate of the institution to assume 
responsibility’.41 This remark emphasises the provision of responsibility and the pre-
determined knowledge of the moral agent who is the bearer of moral responsibility. 
Following Adelman, the UN is charged with the authority and duty to mitigate or prevent 
genocide and ethnic cleansing.42  
 
Defining responsibility 
There are certain conditions under which a moral agent may be held morally accountable 
for her actions or omissions. According to the two ‘negative’ Aristotelian principles, an 
agent should not be ignorant of the facts surrounding her actions, and her actions should 
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not show undue force.43 Equally, the principle of ‘alternate possibilities’ implies that ‘a 
person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done 
otherwise’.44 A point to consider here is the distinction between establishing that the UN 
is a decision-making agent and establishing its capacity to act in a very specific situation, 
such as the humanitarian crisis in the DRC. To be consistent, it is necessary to illustrate 
that the UN had the ability to form corporate decisions and the capacity to control the 
situation and influence the outcome.  
The idea of ‘control’ over actions is central in the philosophical literature,45 and 
assigning responsibilities should always consider the parameters of information 
gathering, decision making, and control over the implementation of the decision. 
Deriving from the notion of control, responsibilities should always be assigned to specific 
bodies bearing the moral burden. For example, the UN Secretariat is the designated body 
to translate UN Security Council mandates into directives of action.46  
 
UN’s moral responsibility in the DRC 
The humanitarian disaster in the DRC could be considered the product of three 
overlapping conflicts rather than a single conflict.47 The first conflict began in 1996 and 
ended with the demise of Zairian President Mobutu (1997). The second Congolese war 
(‘Africa’s Great War’) signified the termination of Congolese President Laurent-Désiré 
Kabila’s dependence on Rwanda and Uganda; it ended with the Lusaka ceasefire 
Agreement (1999). A third conflict running concurrently and continuing to the present is 
taking place in the country’s eastern provinces between armed factions. All conflicts 
were related to the control over territories rich in mineral resources and became defined 
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in ethnic terms (‘territorialization of ethnicity’).48 In essence, then, the conflict in the 
DRC has been multi-level: local, national, and regional, with a ‘cancerous metastasis’ of 
foreign armies and military parties in the DRC from neighbouring countries.49 Hence, 
actors should not be seen in isolation, but within ‘complex networks’ that influence 
decision-making50 and make any effort to assign responsibility extremely difficult.  
Is the UN (morally) accountable for its actions or omissions in the DRC 
humanitarian disaster? In its bid to answer this question, the analysis will consider two 
specific points, namely the UN failure to effectively manage the problem of the refugee 
camps in the eastern provinces of the DRC in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, 
and its stance towards repeated violations of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of 
the DRC by armed groups of neighbouring countries. The refugee crisis is the single most 
important catalyst for the turmoil in the Great Lakes region, while the illegal exploitation 
of the natural resources of the DRC by foreign militias has perpetuated the war and 
created a humanitarian disaster. Further to the latter point, the primary causes of death in 
the DRC are easily preventable and treatable diseases,51 but given the constant state of 
unrest, the vast majority cannot receive treatment. It is estimated that in the Eastern 
provinces, the Crude Mortality Rate is 90% higher than that of Sub-Saharan Africa.52 
 In its broadest definition, accountability involves the scrutiny of a specific action 
or omission against a standard set of norms; in some cases, it involves consequences for 
failing to comply with these norms. In international law, legal responsibility indicates a 
‘particular form of legal accountability, focused upon the legal consequences of breaches 
of international law that are attributable to an international actor’.53 Traditionally 
international law has focused on the rights and obligations of states, limiting the scope of 
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analysis to inter-state interactions. Hence, incorporating perspectives from the study of 
International Relations, Ethics, and organization theory enriches the basic analysis, 
allowing us to discuss more complex phenomena.  
To examine the degree of accountability of the UN and its agencies or bodies, I 
ask the following three questions: i) did the UN have sufficient information about the 
gravity of the situation?; ii) was this information evaluated as required action?; and iii) 
was this information transformed into appropriate action? Admittedly, this is simplistic, 
as complex humanitarian situations cannot be analytically explained in the light of one 
actor – no matter how powerful this actor may be. As mentioned, however, there are 
degrees of accountability, even within the bodies and agencies of the UN; therefore, by 
asking these questions we will be better able to assign responsibility.  
 
i. The ‘spill-over’ of the genocide 
The last days of the genocide (July 1994) found the perpetrators surrounded by 
the Tutsi army. During this period, the only remarkable decision taken by the UN was to 
authorize limited military humanitarian intervention (‘Operation Turquoise’). This 
intervention took place in south-western Rwanda; its primary objective was to evacuate 
foreigners and protect those facing imminent threat.54 Paradoxically, the creation of a 
humanitarian zone provided a secure retreat for the ex-Rwandan government, the army 
(ex-FAR), and the paramilitary perpetrators of the genocide (‘Interahamwe’). More 
importantly, the minimum policing within this zone facilitated the evacuation of virtually 
all their weapons to Zaire, enabling them to regroup and launch attacks against the new 
regime in Kigali.55 As Linda Melvern notes, it was ‘probably the largest group of fugitive 
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murderers ever assembled all fed and sheltered by the aid agencies’.56 Relief aid was 
stolen and taxed by the groups controlling the camps; this fuelled the war economy and 
perpetuated the conflict.57 The Interahamwe and ex- FAR militias hosted in the refugee 
camps were able to rearm and gain considerable military strength, enabling them to 
launch cross-border attacks against Rwanda and ignite local tensions. It is estimated that 
approximately one million entered Zaire at Goma and 200.000 went to Bukavu.                                                                                                                              
 A fundamental point of the UN’s moral accountability is its management of the 
refugee problem when the Hutu refugees settled in Zaire. Over the next two years, with 
the assistance of Mobutu and the passivity of the UN, the forces that committed the 
genocide in Rwanda were reorganized and rearmed within the refugee camps in eastern 
Zaire and eventually launched attacks against both Rwanda and the local Banyamulenge 
(Tutsi) community.58  
             Any assessment of the refugee crisis should consider regional politics. More to 
the point, President Mobutu of Zaire significantly assisted the Hutu leaders in the refugee 
camps to rearm.59 The residents of the eastern provinces of Zaire had been particularly 
hostile towards Mobutu since the 1960s, especially after 1981 when Mobutu attempted to 
marginalize the Banyamulenge community (local residents of Tutsi origin) by passing the 
‘Nationality Act’, depriving them of their Zairian citizenship.60 Therefore, when the Hutu 
refugees arrived, the Rwandan cleavage (Hutu vs. Tutsi) was revitalized in Eastern Zaire. 
Mobutu perceived this as a ‘window of opportunity’ to regain his lost legitimacy in the 
international community, presenting himself as the prudent leader of the region who 
could handle complicated situations.61 Most importantly, Mobutu saw this as a unique 
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opportunity to use the Hutu refugees in the next elections (1997) as a counterweight 
against the local Tutsi,62 or even postpone the elections on grounds of instability.  
             In any case, the Great Lakes’ crisis was unique in its complexity. Had the UN 
sufficient information on this multifaceted crisis to hold it accountable? In fact, in August 
1994, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Sadako Ogata had a clear picture 
of the situation and urgently demanded that the UN set the following in motion: (a) the 
total disarmament of the ex-FAR soldiers and the collection of their weapons; (b) 
isolation and neutralization of Hutu leaders; (c) a mechanism to deal with the perpetrators 
of the genocide; and (d) a mechanism to sustain law and order in the camps.63 Further, 
UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali, in his reports to the Security Council, underlined 
the possibility that the frequent raids of the Hutu refugees into Rwanda would lead to 
full-scale war. The UN was also the first to perceive that the ethnic cleansing of the 
Zairian Tutsi community committed by the Hutu extremists in the refugee camps coupled 
with the attacks against Rwanda were two important factors behind the conflict (1996).64 
A report to the General Assembly states: ‘The primary problem was the international 
community’s failure to separate those who deserved international protection from those 
who did not, ensuring the physical security of the refugees and preventing the 
genocidaires committing violent acts on Nationals and refugees’.65 
            Clearly, the UN understood the situation. To be sure, the exceptional magnitude 
of this humanitarian crisis makes the attribution of responsibility to the UN difficult. 
Arguably, however, the UN Security Council, the designated body for the protection of 
international security,66 failed to transform the warnings of UN bodies (UNHCR and UN 
Secretariat) into robust action.  
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            The UN first pursued a policy of ‘voluntary repatriation’ of the refugees to 
Rwanda.67 This largely ineffective measure ignored the fact that the vast majority of the 
Hutu refugees were hostages of the extremists who carried weapons and controlled the 
distribution of food. In the reality of the refugee camps, ‘voluntary’ was equivalent to the 
will of the most powerful militias, who had no interest in returning to Rwanda where they 
would be prosecuted for their crimes during the genocide or become the victims of 
revenge killings by Tutsi mobs. Even when there was an effort to repatriate some of the 
refugees (August 1994) it was violently stopped by the camp leaders.68  
 Then when the UNHCR demanded the separation of militias from refugees as a 
prerequisite for the normalization of the refugee camps, the UN Security Council did not 
comply. In February 1997, six months after the demand was made by the UNHCR, the 
UN established a highly problematic ‘Zaire Camp Security Contingent.69 This body, 
composed of 1,500 elite Zairian troops, was designated to maintain security in refugee 
camps and facilitate the supply of humanitarian aid.70 The mandate of the mission was 
‘irrelevant’, as the UNCHR had no command over this body; more significantly, there 
was no provision for a mechanism to remove the extremists from the camps.  
          In this fashion, the UN’s omissions enabled the transformation of a refugee crisis 
into regional instability. As previously mentioned, it would be incongruous to hold 
equally responsible different bodies within the same organization, charged with different 
tasks. On the one hand, the UNHCR responded sufficiently to the refugee crisis, 
supplying humanitarian aid under a reign of terror set by the ex-genocidaires, and 
providing valid information and pertinent recommendations for timely action. On the 
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other hand, the UN Security Council did not respond appropriately and thus bears the 
moral burden for this failure.  
 To enumerate its errors, the Security Council first failed to allocate the necessary 
security resources – as indicated by the UNHCR and the Secretary General – to control 
the extremists in the refugee camps. This would have: (a) addressed the security concerns 
of neighbouring countries (Rwanda and Uganda) and prevented the ‘self-help’ solution 
that led to ‘Africa’s Great War’ in 1996; (b) provided a minimum level of security in the 
refugee camps to allow the UNHCR do what it knows best, namely, supply humanitarian 
aid. Instead, the UN Security Council, adversely affected by the divergent views of 
member states on the management of the problem, delayed and hesitated. Suffering from 
‘humanitarian myopia’, the UN Security Council ignored its responsibilities (protecting 
international security) and sent the UNHCR into a pointless humanitarian mission which 
ultimately empowered the extremists and destabilized the region. 71 In fact, the refugees 
mockingly referred to the UNHCR as ‘Hauts Criminels Rassasiés’ (Well-fed Top 
Criminals).72  
Simply stated, it would have been possible for the UN to ‘control’ the camps, but 
the sufficient information coming from the UNHCR was not transformed into robust 
action. Both Zaire and Tanzania received Hutu of Rwandese origin, due, in large part, to 
the cooperation of their governments with the UNHCR and the confiscation of weapons 
in the refugee camps; in Tanzania, at least, their settlement was relatively peaceful.73 The 
successful example of Tanzania illustrates that the situation could have been controlled, 
had the UN so desired; clearly, the UN had not learned from previous experience.  
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           The UN’s moral responsibility is noted by a UNHCR spokesperson who admits 
that ‘the involvement of aid agencies in the camps makes accomplices of us, helping [the 
militias] consolidate power’.74 But responsibility should be assigned to the Security 
Council, the UN’s decision-making body. Factors triggering the first Congolese war 
include the security threat posed by the Rwandan refugee camps to the neighbouring 
countries (Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi), and the proliferation of armed factions in 
Zaire who opposed the leadership of these countries and posed a significant threat.75 This 
inaction resulted in 3.9 million deaths. 
In the Great Lakes region, the UN failed to prevent the transformation of a civil 
conflict into a continental war that involved eight states and numerous armed factions. 
More explicitly, the UN failed in its mission to prevent conflict; Article 1 of the UN 
charter underlines the need for: ‘effective collective measures for prevention and removal 
of threats to peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the 
Peace’ (Article 1, par. 1 UN Charter).   
 
 ii. Aggression 
“The organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members”                                 
(Article 2, par. 1 UN Charter);  
“All members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means […]”  
(Article 2, par. 3 UN Charter);  
“All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the purpose of the UN”   (Article 2, par. 4 UN Charter). 
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The founding principle of the UN is the doctrine of ‘collective security’. This implies the 
obligation of this collective international body to intervene when one of its ‘equally 
sovereign’ member-states experiences a violation of one or more of the central norms of 
international society: state sovereignty; non-intervention; non-use of force; and territorial 
integrity. Foreign armed groups were well-established in the DRC, and Congolese natural 
resources were being exploited by local armed proxies of foreign countries, but the UN 
did nothing. The conflict in the DRC included armed forces from seven neighbouring 
countries, and the DRC became the battlefield of various foreign conflicts, partly 
explaining its fame as ‘Africa’s Great War’.76 Indicatively, Rwanda had approximately 
25,000 to 30,000 soldiers fighting in the territory of the DRC, out of its total armed forces 
of 50,000 to 60,000 troops.77 
 Several foreign conflicts became embedded in the DRC. The primary conflicts 
were the struggle between the Rwandan government which attempted to hunt down ex-
FAR soldiers and the Interahamwe perpetrators of the genocide, and the Hutu rebel 
groups who launched attacks against Kigali.78 Uganda and Angola experienced a similar 
security problem with their rebels stationed on the DRC borders. The Burundian civil war 
also spread to the DRC; this war began in 1993 between the Burundian government 
(FAB-Forces Armees Burundaises) and the FDD (Forces pour la Defense de la 
Democratie) rebels.79 For foreign observers, it was a paradox to see ‘Angolans fighting 
Angolans in western Congo and Rwandans fighting Rwandans in the East’.80 In short, 
however, the DRC experienced outright ‘aggression’ at the hands of a coalition of 
neighbouring states.81 Aggression is defined as any violation of the territorial integrity or 
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political sovereignty of an independent state and ‘is the only crime that states can commit 
against other states’.82  
Was the UN fully aware of this situation? When the fighting started, in November 
1996, UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali argued in favour of creating a ‘Multi-National 
Intervention Force’ (MNF), as the Secretariat had valid information that the situation was 
getting out of control.83 However, the divergent views and policy agendas of the more 
powerful players hindered the creation of a robust mission. For example, the US agenda 
significantly diverged from that of France.84 According to Gérard Prunier, the US was 
reluctant to forcefully intervene. The American sense of ‘guilt’ towards the Tutsi 
government in Rwanda considerably decreased the possibility of taking strong action 
against the victims of the genocide.85 France sought forceful action to save its close ally, 
Mobutu, from being toppled by the coalition of the Rwandan proxies and anti-Mobutu 
rebels. These considerations shaped the UN Security Council Resolution 1097, in 
February 1997, demanding: (a) the cessation of hostilities; (b) the immediate withdrawal 
of all external forces; and (c) the protection of all refugees.86 Lacking any provisions for 
implementation, the resolution reflected the ‘wishful thinking’ of the Security Council. 
Equally, the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, signed in July 1999, formally 
terminating the Second Congolese war, provided for the creation of a UN peacekeeping 
force that would ensure the security of the country.87 However, there was significant 
reluctance on the part of the Security Council to comply. Secretary General Kofi Annan 
repeatedly asked for the deployment of thousands of troops to implement the agreement, 
but the reticence of the Security Council led to Resolution 1291 establishing the ‘Mission 
de l’Organisation des Nations Unies  en RD Congo’ (MONUC) which determined that 
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up to 5,537 military personnel would be deployed for MONUC.88 Even this feeble 
mission -- taking into consideration that the DRC is a country of the size of Western 
Europe -- was not deployed for two years, a delay justified by the security situation on 
the ground.89 In the meantime, the Security Council’s resolutions called on the parties 
involved to cease fire and demanded that the foreign troops leave the country; in other 
words, the Security Council contented itself with using words rather than taking action.90 
In essence, the UN had sufficient information and a specific plan – Lusaka 
Agreement -- that would have enabled the UN to ‘control’/restore peace and stability, or 
at least pacify certain parts of the country. The Lusaka agreement, although not without 
its flaws, would have had a better chance to be successful had the UN Security Council 
complied with the urgent demands of the Secretary General. But MONUC was too little 
too late. Therefore, the UN Security Council should be seen as primarily responsible for 
the failure to transform valid information on the dangers posed to international security 
into appropriate action. In fact, the Security Council’s reticence to intervene was 
masqueraded behind the new catchy phrase ‘African Solutions to African Problems’, 
ignoring that regional leaders were part of the problem.91 
 
‘You never finish eating the meat of an elephant’ 
In the DRC, the violation of these norms occurred in more than just military terms; the 
breach of the state sovereignty was apparent elsewhere, as in the illegal exploitation of 
the natural resources of the DRC by foreign armed groups. As noted above, economic 
interests and the illegal exploitation of Congolese natural resources transformed and 
perpetuated the conflict.
92
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 Broadly speaking, the exploitation occurred in two phases. The first phase (1996-
1998) was characterized by looting and quick transfer of various resources - such as 
minerals, coffee, wood and money - across borders, to the neighbouring patron-states and 
afterwards to the international market. The second phase (1998-2003) was characterized 
by more ‘systematic and systemic’ planning and organization; activity was primarily 
related to minerals, such as diamonds, timber, gold, and cassiterite.93 Control over 
regions rich in natural resources provided unique incentives for the armed factions to 
continue fighting because the exploitation of these resources helped finance the war.94 In 
the view of the UN Secretary General, the fighting between former allies (i.e., Africa’s 
Great War) who justified their invasion of the DRC on security grounds was 
economically motivated.95 As a result, the UN ordered the establishment of the UN Panel 
of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in 
the DRC to explore the link between illegal exploitation of the Congolese natural 
resources and human rights abuses. 
The four reports, published by the Panel between 2001 and 2003, clearly indicated 
that Rwandan, Ugandan, and Zimbabwean army officers, as well as members of the 
Congolese elite, were growing rich from the illegal exploitation of Congo’s mineral 
wealth. They also noted that the extraction of these resources helped the armed groups to 
finance their war-effort and subsequently to perpetuate the war.96 The Panel concluded 
that the illegal exploitation of the natural resources resulted in widespread abuses of 
human rights in the region; further, the withdrawal of foreign armies would not end the 
resource exploitation, since the elite network had created a self-financing war-economy 
by delegating local proxies.97 A critic notes: ‘Between 1996-1997, Rwanda’s Coltan 
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production doubled bringing up to $ 20 million per month in revenue […] From 1997-
1998 the annual volume of Uganda’s diamond exports jumped from 1500 carats to about 
11.300 […] [and] since 1996 Ugandan gold exports have increased tenfold’.98 Uganda 
had no reported Coltan production before 1995, while exports increased gradually 
between 1997 and 1998.99 Hence, the stabilization of Rwanda and Uganda was achieved 
at the expense of DRC’s stability, security and wealth.  
The Rwandan and Ugandan armies officially withdrew from the DRC in 2002 and 
2003 respectively. But they left behind local proxies who, with continued assistance from 
their external backers, fought for the control of trade routes and mineral-rich areas. This 
generated violations of the human rights of the local populations, such as mass 
displacements. Not surprisingly, the Congolese conflict has been characterized -- in 
Clausewitzean terms -- as ‘the continuation of economics by other means’.100 The vicious 
cycle of violence, exploitation, and perpetuation of the conflict is well expressed in the 
Congolese phrase: ‘You never finish eating the meat of an elephant’.101 
The basic rationale behind the establishment of the ‘Panel of Experts’ was to 
‘name and shame’ companies, states, or leaders who profited from illegal and immoral 
activities. However, as Francois Grignon points out, the work of the Panel could have 
been significantly more efficient had the companies involved not threatened the UN with 
lawsuits, not to mention the pressure of the five permanent members of the Security 
Council to exclude their own national companies from the list.102 The UN Security 
Council demanded that the Panel terminate its activities in 2003 because the transitional 
period toward democracy was very fragile in the DRC; naming and shaming endangered 
this process by provoking local leaders/spoilers involved in the process.103 
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It is worth noting that the response time of the UN Security Council has 
significantly improved since its failure in the refugee crisis. It seems that, to some extent, 
previous experiences have become an important way for the UN Secretary General to 
attract the attention of the Security Council. The Security Council has also learned 
alternative ways to be efficient, particularly when the member-states of the Security 
Council are reluctant to act, as, for example, the Panel of Experts or the ‘naming and 
shaming’ approach. Largely due to the personal proactive involvement of Kofi Annan, in 
July 2003, the UN Security Council followed the recommendations of the Panel of 
Experts and imposed an arms embargo on all foreign and Congolese armed groups and 
militias operating in the eastern provinces of Congo.104 Then, in 2004, a ‘Sanctions 
Committee’ was established to oversee the implementation of the arms embargo; since 
then, its mandate has been renewed nine times. Finally, MONUC gradually became the 
world’s largest deployed UN mission, with approximately 19,815 military personnel on 
the ground.105 
Taking all these factors into consideration, should the UN be held accountable for 
the management of the security situation which resulted from the illegal exploitation of 
the DRC’s natural resources? I argue that it should be seen as morally accountable 
because although it was cognizant of the illegal exploitation and the violation of state 
sovereignty, its response was delayed and minimal.106  
The UN Reports of the ‘Panel of Experts’ analysed the mechanisms of economic 
exploitation; the Panel noted that this was perpetuating regional instability and human 
suffering. The Second Congolese war began in 1996, but the first official enquiry into the 
primary cause of the conflict was ordered five years later, denoting the reluctance of the 
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UN Security Council to address this problem. Additionally, the first reports of the ‘Panel’ 
in 2001 gave a clear picture of the link between the exploitation of natural resources, the 
perpetuation of war, and human rights abuses.  The Security Council could and should 
have acted more promptly in the early years of the conflict. It is estimated that between 
1996 and 2003 (the latter date representing the Security Council’s decision to enforce an 
arms embargo), the casualties reached 3.9 million.107 After 2003, the UN was 
considerably more proactive. 
 
 
Conclusion 
The case study of the Congolese conflict reasserts the primary hypothesis that the UN can 
be held morally accountable for its actions and omissions. As the case of the DRC 
illustrates, there are degrees of moral accountability even within bodies of the same 
international organization, especially in such a complex and unique organization as the 
UN. Even more importantly, assigning responsibilities should be case-specific, since 
moral inquiries should always consider the context.  
 This paper’s objective was to examine to what extent the UN was morally 
responsible in the (mis)management of the refugee camps in the immediate aftermath of 
the Rwandan genocide and the (mis)management of the violation of territorial integrity 
and state sovereignty of the DRC by neighbouring countries. Briefly stated, the UN had 
ample information and early warnings from its own agencies (UNHCR) or ad hoc bodies 
(Panel of Experts). UN agencies assigned a problem should be located within the 
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decision-making structure and involved in the transformation of decisions into 
appropriate actions. In these two respects, the UN Security Council failed. 
            Simply stated, collective international bodies have a moral responsibility; hence, 
their actions or inactions can be praised or blamed. This has several practical 
implications, such as whether states/international institutions should apologise for 
historical injustices, be bearers of international criminal responsibility, be subject to 
sanctions, etc.108 It is absurd to talk about the existence of an ‘international society’ 
without having expectations of its central representative, namely the UN. Indeed, it was 
founded on the slogan ‘Never Again’. Thus, the critical stance towards the UN adopted in 
this analysis is intended as a constructive critique; its primary objective is the more 
efficient functioning of the UN in the future.  
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